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This paper considers the creation of common political institutions by two competing,
selfish groups. Inspired by the literature studying contractual solutions to hold up
problems, we model political institutions as a mechanism that allocates the available
social surplus to the different groups as a function of their investments, and is chosen
optimally at the beginning of the game.
Our main contribution is to explicitly consider the possibility that, after common
institutions are created, each group can unilaterally dissolve them by triggering a
non-cooperative game, which we call a conflict. The payoffs in case of conflict are
determined by the players’ investments. Hence, political institutions need to satisfy
two endogenous, ex-post participation constraints, which depend on the equilibrium
investment of the non-deviating player. As we will see, this feature will play a
key role in the design of the optimal mechanism, which might distort each player’s
investment profile as a way to discourage the opponent from deviating. Beside
these ex-post participation constraints, we do not impose any additional limitation
on the political institutions that can be chosen. We assume full information and full
“contractibility” (that is, the mechanism can specify payoffs contingent on all types
of investments), as well as full commitment (that is, the mechanism can credibly
threaten to destroy welfare). Furthermore, we assume that conflict is inefficient.
Our results are quite negative. There may no mechanism that achieves the
first best. Intuitively, if each group expects the other group to choose the first-
best investment profile, the benefit of deviating and triggering a conflict may be
very large, possibly exceeding the available social surplus. In this case, the optimal
mechanism may need to distort the players’ investment profile away from the first
best, so to reduce the incentive to trigger a conflict. Hence, first-best efficiency may
be incompatible with peace, but an inefficient peace may be able to prevent conflict.
However, distorting the investment profiles to discourage deviations also reduces
the total surplus to be shared in case of peace. It follows that a mechanism that
achieves peace may not exist. Conflict casts a shadow on political institutions, and
generates inefficiencies also in case of peace. These inefficiencies may be so large
that an inefficient conflict is the only possible outcome of the game.
We illustrate our point via a general model and an example. The example is a
version of the “guns and butter” model in Skaperdas (1992), in which two players
first invest in guns (i.e. weapons) and butter (i.e. productive activities), and then
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decide whether to trigger a conflict. Unlike Skaperdas (1992), we allow the players
to create common political institutions before investing.1 This allows the players
to maintain peace also when, under Skaperdas (1992)’s assumptions the outcome
should be conflict. More interestingly, in our model, to maintain peace the optimal
political institutions may require the players to invest in guns. This discourages each
player from triggering a conflict, because he now anticipates that he will fight an
opponent who is armed. Of course, by mandating a positive investment in arms, the
optimal political institutions generate an inefficiency. This inefficiency is a function
of the destructiveness of the conflict—with more destructive conflict requiring lower
investment in guns to prevent deviations and hence generating lower inefficiency. If
the destructiveness of the conflict is sufficiently low, it is possible that conflict is the
unique equilibrium of the game.
Hence, similarly to other theories of conflict, whether peace can be maintained is
a function of the destructiveness of the conflict. However, and specific to our context,
there is a relationship between the destructiveness of the conflict and welfare under
peace—because less destructive conflict implies that higher distortions imposed by
the political institutions. This type of “armed peace” is the optimal outcome given
the players’ ex-post participation constraints. We then modify the example by
introducing a second type of productive investment: eggs. Eggs are more costly
to produce than butter, but they are are more easily destroyed in case of conflict.
Hence, in the first best, the players only invest in butter. To prevent deviations,
however, the optimal political institutions may require the players to invest both in
eggs and in guns. Interestingly, we show that the if the optimal political institutions
mandate positive investment in eggs, they also mandate positive investment in guns.
Otherwise, a player may deviate by switching 100% of his investment to butter
without fear of being attached—which can be a profitable deviation but, clearly,
not an equilibrium of the conflict game.
Finally, two comments on the methodology. We model political institutions as a
very abstract mechanism to induce a level of investment and then share the resulting
social surplus. We do not worry about how a specific political institution may achieve
this. Our results therefore provide an upper bound to what more realistic political
institutions that face additional constraints (such as informational constraints or
commitment issues) can achieve, both in terms of social welfare in case of peace
1 Other similar model of cooperation and conflict in the absence of institutions are Taylor (1987),
Grossman and Kim (1995), and Hirshleifer (1995).
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and in terms of preventing inefficient conflict. Second, for ease of exposition we
only consider a finite-time game in which first the players invest, and then there is
either conflict or peace. But the model can also be interpreted as a reduced form
of an infinitely-repeated game. In this case, the payoff from conflict is the expected
present discounted value of deviating one period and then playing conflict in every
subsequent period (as in a grim-trigger strategy). The payoff from peace is the
expected present discounted value of maintaining peace in every period.
Related literature
The idea that political institutions operate “in the shadow of conflict” is well known
in political philosophy, and is central to most theories of the social contract. In
particular, in Thomas Hobbes’ view, absent political institutions people would live
in “the state of nature”: the outcome of non-cooperative, violent, rule-free interac-
tions. Hence the role of political institutions is to provide security and peace. Note
that Hobbes’ argument readily extends beyond security and peace to all forms of
collective action problems, such as for example the provision of public goods (see
Taylor, 1987, chapter 1). The possibility of reverting to the state of nature, however,
imposes a constraint on the allocations that can be implemented by the political
institutions (see Taylor, 1987, chapter 6).
This paper is motivated by the observation that social surplus to be shared in
case of peace and the payoffs in case of conflict (i.e., in the state of nature) depend,
at least in part, from prior investments made by the different individual/groups
who participate in these political institutions. The endogeneity of these payoffs
distinguishes our theory from the existing economic analysis of Hobbes’ political
philosophy (for example that of Esteban and Sákovics, 2008, Bester and Wärneryd,
2006) and connects us with the literature studying contractual arrangements. In
particular we are related to the literature studying contracts with endogenous ex-
post outside options.2 Importantly, the novelty of our paper is that, here, the ex-post
2 The most famous model of contracting with endogenous outside option is that of Gibbons and
Murphy (1992), in which after signing a labor contract, a worker can take actions that increase
his/her outside option. See also Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), Che and Hausch (1999), and
Chatterjee and Chiu (2013), in which an agent can make a productive investment that affects
both the value of transacting with the other player and the value of transacting with third parties.
Also related are Kranton and Minehart (2000), Kranton and Minehart (2001) and Elliott (2015),
who consider a network of buyers and sellers, in which each player can spend resources to link
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outside option is a conflict, which implies that a player’s incentive to deviate (i.e.,
choose his ex-post outside option) depends on the investments made by both players.
We are also related to the literature on self-enforcing (or relational) contracts,
studying infinitely repeatd games in which each player can always deviate to an
outside option. The vast majority of papers is this literature assume that this
outside option is exogenous.3 An exception is Thomas and Worrall (2018), in which
each player’s outside option is increasing in the action (that is, productive effort)
of the other player. They also show that a player’s action may be distorted so to
discourage the other player from deviating. The main difference with our model is
the scope of the focus of the analysis. Thomas andWorrall (2018) study the long run-
evolution of this distortion, and establish condition under which it converges, and its
limit. Here instead we consider multiple types of investments are are interested in
understanding precisely what margins will be distorted by the political institutions.4
By aiming at connecting the theory of social contract with modern contract
theory, our paper ends up connecting the literature studying inefficient conflicts and
secession, with the literature studying endogenous political institutions.5 In order to
reconcile rationality with conflict, the first strand of literature proposes a number of
explanations such as asymmetric information between the players, conflict over large
indivisibles, or the inability to commit to initial agreements. Lack of commitment
is also at the base of out model, because the players cannot commit not to trigger a
with an additional buyer/seller and therefore increase his bargaining power. Also relevant is
Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001), who study bargaining protocols leading to efficient non-
contractible investments prior to matching.
3 See, for example, Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002) and Ray (2002). Interestingly, in these
papers if the outside option is sufficiently high (but not too high) then only “second best” cooper-
ative outcomes can be sustained in equilibrium.
4 There is also a second, methodological difference: in Thomas and Worrall (2018) contracts
cannot be enforced. The incentive to act cooperatively (i.e., choose a positive action and and then
not trigger the outside option) exclusively comes from the infinite horizon of the game. In our
framework instead, agreements (which here take the form of institutions) are enforceable up to the
players’ endogenous outside options. This implies, for example, that cooperation is possible also
in a finite-horizon game.
5 On inefficient conflicts, see the survey article by Jackson and Morelli, 2011. On inefficient
secession, see a recent paper by Esteban, Flamand, Morelli, and Rohner, 2018. On endogenous
political institutions, the most closely related papers are the ones studying optimal design of
constitutions (see the seminal work of Buchanan and Tullock, 1962 as well as the more recent
Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi, 2004).
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conflict ex-post. However, contrary to existing theories (such as Fearon, 1995, and
Powell, 2006), in our model the players’ ability to commit is endogenous and depends
on the investment profiles mandated by the political institutions. To prevent conflict,
these investment profiles may be inefficient. As a consequence, we also provide a
novel rationale why inefficient political institutions may emerge.6
Finally, some of the issues discussed in this paper were also discussed in Canidio
and Esteban (2018), in which two players can make investments before negotiating
an agreement. In that paper we consider a very specific family or arbitration pro-
cedures and derive the welfare maximizing one. Here instead we do not impose any
structure (and therefore any constraint) on the ability of the mechanism to affect
the ex-post payoffs.
2 General model
We start by presenting a general model that illustrates our main results, albeit on a
somewhat abstract level. In the next sections we consider more specific models and
derive additional results.
There are two players, 1 and 2, which we interpret as two independent regions.
In the first period of the game the two players agree to set up common political insti-
tutions. These institutions are chosen cooperatively (e.g., via Nash bargaining) and
players can perform side transfers. It follows that the common political institutions
set up by the players maximize the sum of their continuation utilities.
In the following period, both players simultaneously choose a vector of invest-
ments xi ∈ Xi ⊂ RL+ for i ∈ {1, 2} (e.g., transport infrastructures, universities, R&D
labs, weapons, military bases, ...), where X represents the set of feasible investment
vectors and is assumed to be a compact set.7 After investing, there can be either a
conflict or peace. Conflict occurs in two cases:
1. if the players did not set up common political institutions. Because the com-
6 A similar argument is provided by Acemoglu (2003) and Acemoglu (2006), who show that if
elites cannot commit to a given set of transfers, then the political outcome may be inefficient. In
both papers, however, there is no possibility of conflict. Our argument is therefore related but not
identical to that in Acemoglu (2003) and Acemoglu (2006).
7 Assuming that X is a compact set is the simplest way to guarantee the existence of the first-
best level of investment, of the best responses of the conflict game, and of the Nash equilibrium.
Of course, other assumptions are possible.
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mon political institutions are chosen cooperatively, this will happen only if
welfare in case of conflict is greater than welfare in case of peace under all
possible political institutions. As we will see, this is the only type of conflict
that emerges in the equilibrium of the game.
2. if, after setting up common political institutions, a player unilaterally decides
to trigger one. That is, after common political institutions are set up, the
players simultaneously choose their investment levels and whether to trigger
a conflict or not. As we will see, this type of conflict never happens in equi-
librium, but its possibility will nonetheless impose a constraint on the type of
political institutions that can be chosen initially.
In case of conflict the players’ utilities are α · u1(x1, x2), α · u2(x1, x2), where
u1(x1, x2), u2(x1, x2) are continuous and positive for all x1, x2 . The parameter
α > 0 measures the destructiveness of the conflict, with lower values corresponding
to a more destructive conflict, and is a useful way to parameterize the benefit of
maintaining peace. If there is no conflict, then there is peace, in which case the
common political institutions acquire the control of x1, x2, use them to produce
W (x1, x2), and then transfers π1(x1, x2) to player 1 and π2(x1, x2) to player 2.8 The
choice of political institutions at the beginning of the game therefore amounts to the
choice of the functions π1(x1, x2) and π2(x1, x2) subject to the feasibility constraint
π2(x1, x2) ≤ W (x1, x2)− π1(x1, x2). See Figure 1 for the timeline.
Define:
{x∗∗1 , x∗∗2 } ≡ argmaxx1∈X,x2∈XW (x1, x2)
as the surplus maximizing investment levels in case no conflict occurs (note that
{x∗∗1 , x∗∗2 } could be a set). Define xBR1 (x2) and xBR2 (x1) as the two players’ best
responses in case of conflict
xBRi (x−i) = argmaxxi∈Xui(x1, x2).
8 Note that we are abstracting away from the cost of investing. Without loss of generality, we
can assume that these costs are embedded in the functions u1(x1, x2), u2(x1, x2) and W (x1, x2).
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Choice of political institutions
π1(x1, x2), π2(x1, x2)
investments x1, x2
ex-ante ex-post
Peace: payoffs π1(x1, x2), π2(x1, x2)
Conflict: payoffs α · u1(x1, x2), α · u2(x1, x2)
Fig. 1: Timeline












Finally, we call α̃ as the value of α such that, from the ex-ante viewpoint (that is,
before the investments are made), the sum of the players’ utilities in the equilibrium
of the conflict game is equal to the maximum surplus in case of peace, that is













Our main assumption is that conflict is inefficient:
α < α̃ (A1)
Discussion. A few aspects of the model deserves to be discussed in some details.
To start, as we will see, the optimal political institutions will impose some legally
binding investment levels. Therefore, on the equilibrium path, the model is obser-
vationally equivalent to a situation in which the investment levels x1, x2 are chosen
9 If the Nash equilibrium of the conflict game is not unique, we restrict our attention to the
Pareto preferred one. Our notation implicitly assumes that this equilibrium is in pure strategy,
but our argument holds identical if the equilibrium instead is in mixed strategy (the only difference
is that the utility in the equilibrium of the conflict game is now an expectation).
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directly by the common political institutions. It is however key for our results that
players could deviate to a different investment level (at the cost, of course, of either
being punished by the common institutions, or of triggering a conflict).
Also, it is important to clarify that conflict is inefficient from the ex-ante view-
point: that is, taking into consideration the fact that the equilibrium level of in-
vestment in case of conflict may be different from the first best one. However, we
do not assume that conflict is inefficient ex-post (that is, for a given investment
level). This will depends on the details of the conflict game. For example, in a
public good game, for given investment levels social surplus in case of conflict is the
same as social welfare in case of peace. If instead the non-cooperative game is a
tournament in which the player exert fighting effort, then it is possible that conflict
is less efficient than peace for every investment levels. Under our assumptions, it is
also possible that, for some investment profiles, conflict is preferred to peace.
Finally, an implicit assumption is that the conflict payoffs depend only on the
investment profiles and not on how the conflict came about. This is with loss of
generality because, for given x1, x2, a conflict emerging because no common political
institutions were set up may generate very different payoffs from a conflict started
by a player while the other player expected the common political institution to
survive. However, keeping track of how the conflict came about would significantly
increase the complexity of the notation, for no additional insights. The utility in case
a conflict emerging because no common political institutions were set up matters
exclusively in determining whether conflict is efficient or inefficient (that is, whether
A1 holds). What matters for the analysis of the optimal political institutions is
the utility that each player can earn if he triggers a conflict while the other player
invests as prescribed by the political institutions.
Optimal political institutions
Without loss of generality, assume that the initial agreement between the two players
has the following form:
• The political institutions will mandate two investment profiles x̄1 and x̄2 and
will guarantee utility levels Ū1 and Ū2 ≤ W (x̄1, x̄2)− Ū1 to the two players.
• The political institutions will impose the largest possible punishment to any
player deviating from their prescribed investment level. Because, ex-post,
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each player can unilaterally trigger a conflict, the largest punishment that the
political institutions can impose is to keep the deviating player to the utility
she would achieve in case of conflict.
Mathematically, such political institutions have the form:10
πi(x1, x2) =
Ūi if xi = x̄iα · ui(x1, x2) otherwise (2)
Suppose player i expects player −i to follow the prescribed investment level. If
player i decides to deviate from x̄i, by (2) it should deviate to xBRi (x̄−i). It follows
that there is no profitable deviation from investment levels x̄1 and x̄2 if and only if:
Ū1 ≥ α · u1(xBR1 (x̄2), x̄2) and Ū2 ≥ α · u2(x̄1, xBR2 (x̄1)).
Note, therefore, that the game is similar to prisoner’s dilemma: the players are
jointly better off by maintaining peace, but if a player expects the opponent to
invest the prescribed amount under peace, this player may want to trigger a conflict.
Crucially, however, here the incentive to deviate is determined by investment levels
prescribed by the political institution, which are endogenous.
For given x̄1 and x̄2, there exist Ū1, Ū2 ≤ W (x̄1, x̄2) − Ū1 that satisfy both
constraints if and only if:
W (x̄1, x̄2) ≥ α · u1(xBR1 (x̄2), x̄2) + α · u2(x̄1, xBR2 (x̄1)). (3)
Given this, to solve for the optimal political institutions we need to find the x̄1 and
x̄2 that maximize W (x̄1, x̄2) subject to (3). If such political institutions exist and
generates higher welfare than conflict, then the optimal political institutions are the















1 ) ≤ u2(x∗1, x∗2)
(4)
10 The reason why it is without loss of generality to restrict our attention to such political
institutions is because, by definition, they impose the largest possible punishment on any deviation.
That is, if a given π1(x1, x2), π2(x1, x2) generates an equilibrium level of investments x̄1 and x̄2
then also π1(x1, x2), π2(x1, x2) as in (2) generates the equilibrium level of investments x̄1 and x̄2.
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there exists an α̂ < α̃ (where α̃ is defined in 1) such that for α ≤ α̂ the optimal po-
litical institutions achieve the first best, while for α̂ < α < α̃ no political institutions
achieve the first best.11
To understand the above proposition, note that α · u1(x∗1, x∗2) and α · u2(x∗1, x∗2)
are the utilities in case of conflict and hence they are the ex-ante outside options:
the players’ best alternative to setting up common political institutions. Instead
α · u1(xBR1 (x∗∗2 ), x∗∗2 ) and α · u2(x∗∗1 , xBR2 (x∗∗1 )) are the utility that each player earns
by triggering a conflict against an opponent that invested the first best level. They
are the players’ ex-post outside option (assuming the first best level of investment).
The proposition therefore makes clear that when the ex-ante outside option is
greater than the ex post outside option the first best is always achievable. This
would be the case if, for example, the payoff in case of conflict is independent from
the players’ investment. It would also be the case if the first-best level of investment
is, for the most part, not appropriable in case of conflict (see Section 3.1 for an
example). It corresponds to the “textbook” hold up problem, in which the fact
that the ex-post outside option is endogenous is irrelevant, and hence because of
full observability and full contractibility the first best is always achieved. When the
ex-post outside option is above the ex-ante outside option, instead, whether the first
best is achievable depends on how large is the benefit of peace (as measured by α).
If the first best is not achievable, the optimal political institutions will need to
distort the investment levels so that (3) is satisfied with equality. This can only
be achieved by reducing the RHS of (3). That is, in order to maximize welfare,
the political institutions will need to distort the investment mix so to make conflict
more costly. Doing so increases the punishment that the political institutions can
impose on each player in case of deviation (the RHS of 3). At the same time, it also
reduces the peace payoff below the first best, and with it the benefit of maintaining
11 Note that the proposition implicitly assumes that {x∗∗2 , x∗∗2 } is unique. If it is not unique, then
the optimal political institutions always achieve the first best if there exists a x1, x2 ∈ {x∗∗2 , x∗∗2 }
such that 4 holds. If instead 5 holds for all x1, x2 ∈ {x∗∗2 , x∗∗2 }, then the first best is achievable for
low α but not for high α.
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peace (the LHS of 3). As a consequence, at the x̄1, x̄2 such that (3) is satisfied with
equality, we may have
W (x̄1, x̄2) < α · u(x∗1, x∗2) + α · u(x∗2, x∗1),
that is, the distortion in the investment mix required to maintain peace is so severe,
that conflict is preferred to such peace. It is also possible that there is no value
of x̄1, x̄2 that satisfies (3), in which case the only possible outcome is conflict. The
next lemma provides sufficient condition for conflict to emerge, either because it is
the most efficient outcome, or because it is the only possible outcome.
Lemma 1. If α is sufficiently close to α̃ and (5) holds, then the unique outcome is
conflict.
Hence, despite the fact that peace is efficient, achieving peace may not be desir-
able or even possible if the investment mix needs to be distorted in order to prevent
the players from triggering conflict. Finally, note that whenever neither (4) nor
(5) hold, then whether the first best is achievable depends not only on the conflict
function u(., .), but also on the payoff in case of peace W (x∗∗1 , x∗∗2 ).
3 Exampl: guns and butter.
We now consider a conflict game that is a special case of the guns and butter
model in Skaperdas (1992). Unlike in our paper, in Skaperdas (1992) the players
are not allowed to set up political institutions and hence, if they are symmetric
the outcome of the game is conflict.12 One of our goal here is, therefore, to make
transparent how the possibility of choosing political insitutions changes Skaperdas
(1992)’s results. Our second goal is to generate more detailed predictions with
respect to the distortions that the optimal political institutions may need to impose
in order to maintain peace.
The players’ investment levels are here xi = {gi, bi}, where gi ≥ 0 are guns and
bi ≥ 0 is butter, with g1+bi = 1. In case of peace, total surplus to be shared is b1+b2.
The first-best level of welfare is equal to 2, which is achieved by investing all resources
in butter. In case of conflict, instead, player i earns α(b1 + b2) with probability
12 If the players are asymmetric, then Skaperdas (1992) shows that conflict may be avoided also
in the absence of political institutions.
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gi/(g1 + g2), where α ≥ 0. If no player invests in guns and a conflict occurs, each
player probability of winning is 1/2. Butter therefore represents investments that
are productive both in peace and in case of conflict (but possibly differently so
depending on α). Guns instead are non-productive investments that increase the
probability of winning a conflict.
Again, the parameter α measures the inefficiency of conflict. For example, the
use of guns during a conflict may destroy part of the investment in butter, which
implies α < 1. If instead α > 1, then a given investment in butter generates
higher utility in conflict than in peace. We do not think that this last case is
particularly realistic,13 but we will nonetheless consider it in our analysis to illustrate
the theoretical possibility that an inefficient conflict is the unique outcome of the
game.
Conflict. We start by solving the conflict game. The two best responses are:
gBRi (x−i) =
√
2g−i − g−i, bBRi (x−i) = 1− gBRi (x−i)
The Nash equilibrium is g∗1 = g∗2 =
1
2
, b∗1 = b∗2 =
1
2
, e∗1 = e∗2 = 0. Social surplus in
case of conflict is equal to α. Assumption (A1) holds as long as α < 2, which we
assume.
Optimal political institutions. To start, note that, here (5) holds and therefore,
by Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, we should expect that for low values of α the first
best is achievable, for intermediate values of α the first best is not achievable but
may be possible to achieve peace, for high values of α conflict is the unique outcome.
The political institutions set mandatory investment levels b̄1 ≥ 0, b̄2 ≥ 0, ḡ1 =
1− b̄1 ≥ 0, ḡ2 = 1− b̄2 ≥ 0 under the threat of a punishment that cannot exceed a
player’s outside option. Equation (3) here is equivalent to:













The important thing to note is that mandating a given investment in guns de-
creases each player’s incentive to deviate, because each player anticipates that, if
he deviates, he will fight against a stronger opponent. Investing in guns, however,
generates a welfare loss and makes maintaining peace less valuable.
13 This is not to say that it is completely unreasonable. For example, it is a known fact that the
marginal utility of consumption of some goods increases with the level of stress.
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Proposition 2. The first best is achievable if and only if α ≤ 1
2
.
The above proposition follows by simple inspection of (6). Quite intuitively, at
the first-best level of investment each player trigger a conflict and capture the entire
surplus by investing arbitrarily little in guns. It is possible to prevent both players
from deviating only if conflict destroys at least half of the surplus, so that the sum
of the utilities from deviating is below the first-best level of welfare.
If, instead α > 1
2
, then conflict is not sufficiently destructive and, as a conse-
quence, the first best is not achievable. Hence the optimal political process will need
to impose positive investment in guns, so to make (7) binding.
Proposition 3. Whenever 1/2 < α ≤ 1, the optimal political institutions maintain
peace by imposing









Social welfare is strictly decreasing in α, and equal to social welfare in case of conflict
for α = 1.
Whenever α > 1 then it is not possible to satisfy (6) and the unique outcome of
the game is conflict.
Figure 2 plots total investment in guns and social welfare in equilibrium. The
bottom line is that conflict is avoided by setting up political institutions that re-
quire both players to make a positive investment in guns. This investment in guns
decreases with the destructiveness of the conflict (as measured by α) because, as α
decreases, a smaller investment in guns by a player is required in order to “punish”
the other player in case of deviation. It follows that if α is sufficiently small welfare
in case of peace achieves the first best level. If instead α is sufficiently large the
required punishment is so large that it is not possible to maintain peace, and an
inefficient conflict is the only outcome. Contrast this result with Skaperdas (1992),
who does not allow the players to agree on the political institutions ex ante and
therefore finds that conflict is the unique equilibrium of the game for every α. Note
also that, here, the equilibrium level of welfare is non-monotonic in α: it decreases in
α whenever the political institutions can maintain peace, and increase in α in case
of conflict. In Skaperdas (1992), instead, because conflict is the unique outcome
social welfare is always increasing in α.












Fig. 2: Equilibrium investment in guns (blue line) and social welfare (red line)
3.1 Extension: guns, butter and eggs
The general model shows that, in order to maintain peace, the political institutions
may distort the players’ investment away from the first best level. In the simple
model above, this distortion takes the form of requiring players to invest in arms.
But, in general, other distortion may emerge. For example, there could be multi-
ple types of productive investments, some more appropriable than others in case of
conflict. In this case, it is possible that the political institutions will tilt the invest-
ment mix toward the least appropriable productive investment in order to reduce
the players’ payoff in case of conflict.
To illustrate this possibility, we consider a variation of first example in which
there are three types of investments: guns gi, butter bi and eggs ei with gi+bi+ei = 1.
Eggs are valuable in case of peace, but may be less valuable than butter: total surplus
in case of peace is b1 +b2 +τ(e1 +e2) for τ ∈ [0, 1], where τ is a parameter measuring
the marginal rate of technical substitution between butter and eggs in case of peace.
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Again, the first-best social surplus is 2. In case of conflict, player i earns α(b1 + b2)
with probability gi/(g1 + g2).
Hence, whereas butter is valuable both in peace an in conflict, eggs are valu-
able only in peace (because they easily break). For example, butter could represent
physical capital while eggs could represent human capital. Furthermore, producing
butter is always more efficient than producing eggs (strictly so if τ < 1), but more
so in case of conflict than in case of peace. As we will see, this implies that, to dis-
courage conflict, the optimal political institutions may mandate positive investment
in eggs even if τ < 1.
Conflict. The fact that eggs are not valuable in case of conflict implies that the
conflict game is a standard “guns and butter” game as in Skaperdas (1992). The
two best responses are:
gBRi (x−i) =
√
(2− e−i)g−i − g−i, bBRi (x−i) = 1− gBRi (x−i), eBRi (x−i) = 0.
The Nash equilibrium is, again, g∗1 = g∗2 =
1
2
, b∗1 = b∗2 =
1
2
, e∗1 = e∗2 = 0. Social
surplus in case of conflict is, again, equal to α, and therefore (A1) holds.
Optimal political institutions. In case τ = 1, condition (4) applies and, by Propo-
sition 1, the first best is achievable. If τ < 1, condition (5) applies and, again by
Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, for low values of α the first best is achievable, for in-
termediate values of α the first best is not achievable but peace may be possible, for
high values of α conflict is the unique outcome. Of course, the difference with the
“guns and butter” model presented earlier is that the thresholds determining what
case emerges here will depend on τ .
Again, the political institutions set mandatory investment levels b̄1, b̄2, ē1, ē2, ḡ1, ḡ2
under the threat of a punishment that cannot exceed a player’s outside option.
Equation (3) here is equivalent to:












Plus two feasibility constraints: 0 ≤ ēi ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ḡi ≤ 1− ei.
Similarly to mandating a given investment in guns, also mandating a given in-
vestment in eggs decreases each player’s incentive to deviate. Investing in eggs
implies that social surplus is less appropriable by the other player in case of con-
flict. Also in the case of eggs, however, preventing conflict may come at the cost of
reducing the surplus in case of peace.
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The next proposition shows that introducing the possibility of investing in eggs
expands the range of α for which it is possible to prevent conflict.
Proposition 4. if α ≤ 1 or τ = 1 it is always possible to maintain peace (that




instead it is never possible to maintain peace. If




it is possible to maintain peace for τ ≥ α
1−α2+2α but not otherwise.
Note that the above proposition does not address the question of when the
political process will want to maintain peace. That is, it is possible that peace can
be maintained but the distortion required is so large that conflict is preferred to
peace. We return to this point later (see Corollary 1).
The next proposition provides the full solution for the case α = 1.
Proposition 5. Assume α = 1. If τ < 4/7 then the solution is again the one
derived in Proposition 3: ḡ1 = ḡ2 = b̄1 = b̄2 = 1/2, ē1 = ē2 = 0, welfare in case of
peace is equal to welfare in case of conflict.
If instead τ ≥ 4/7, then





ḡ1 = ḡ2 =




b̄1 = b̄2 = 0
welfare in case of peace is strictly greater than welfare in case of conflict, increasing
in τ and converging to its first-best level for τ → 1.
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the solution. For low τ the
optimal political process will impose positive investment in butter and guns, but
no investment in eggs. The solution is therefore the same derived in the previous
section. For higher τ instead the investment in eggs will be positive, and will be
used to maintain peace also for α such that, absent eggs, there would be conflict.
Perhaps surprisingly, a positive investment in guns is always required in order to
maintain peace, even when the investment in eggs is positive. The reason is that,
if all resources are invested in eggs and there is peace, total surplus is 2τ and each
player receives τ . A deviating player could instead invest almost all his resources in
butter and very little resources in guns, then trigger a conflict and enjoy a utility
equal to (approximately) 1. That is, because butter is more productive than eggs,
when all resources are invested in eggs a player may deviate not to appropriate the
other player’s resources, but rather to switch from investing in eggs to investing in
butter. As a consequence, if τ < 1 to prevent this deviation some resources will
need to be invested in guns.






Fig. 3: Equilibrium investment in eggs (blue line), in guns (gray line) and social
welfare (red line)
Finally, the above proposition serves to illustrate the fact that sometimes the
political institutions could maintain peace, but at the cost of a distortions so large
that conflict is preferred to peace.
Corollary 1. Suppose α > 1 but approximately close to 1. Suppose τ ∈ (1/2, 4/7).
Then peace could be maintained but conflict is preferred to peace.
The fact that peace could be maintained follows directly from Proposition 4.
The fact that conflict is preferred to peace follows by continuity to the case α = 1
considered in Proposition 5. The only difference is that when α = 1 it is possible
to maintain peace without investing in eggs, leading to the same social welfare as
conflict. If τ ∈ (1/2, 4/7), either peace without eggs or conflict are strictly preferred
to a peace with eggs. If α is just above 1, instead, it is not possible to maintain
peace without eggs. Nonetheless, by continuity welfare in case of conflict is strictly
preferred to a peace with eggs.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we connect Hobbes’ political philosophy with modern contract theory.
We consider a model in which two groups set up common political institutions
and then decide on a vector of investments. Political institutions are modeled as
an abstract mechanism that allocate payoffs to the players as a function of their
investment.
Each group can, ex-post, trigger a conflict that dissolves these political institu-
tions. The political institutions are therefore “in the shadow of conflict”: the payoff
they allocate to the two groups cannot be below what these groups can obtain from
conflict. We abstract away from all other forms of frictions and imperfections. De-
spite this, we find that the first best may not be achievable, in the sense that the
optimal political institutions may need to distort the players’ investment mix away
from the first best. To better illustrate what these distortions may look like, we
consider a guns and butter model á la Skaperdas (1992) and show that the political
institutions may require the players to invest in guns. We also consider an exten-
sion in which there are multiple productive investments, and show that the optimal
political institutions may distort the investment mix toward productive investments
that are less appropriable in case of conflict. Finally, it is possible that an inefficient
conflict is the unique outcome of the game. This will happen when the distortion
required to maintain peace are too large.
Mathematical Appendix
Proof of 1. By evaluating (3) at the first best level of investment, it is immediate
to establish that the first best is achievable if and only if:
W (x∗∗1 , x
∗∗
2 ) ≥ α · u1(xBR1 (x∗∗2 ), x∗∗2 ) + α · u(x∗∗1 , xBR2 (x∗∗1 )). (8)
By (A1), the above condition is always satisfied whenever 4 holds. This establishes
the first part of the proposition.






















The second part of the proposition follows by defining â as:

















so that for α ≤ α̂ then (8) holds, but for α̂ < α < α̃ (A1) is satisfied but (8) is
violated.
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume that α = α̃, so that conflict achieves the first best. If
(3) has no solution, then it is not possible to achieve peace. If instead (3) has a
solution, by the previous proposition it must be at some x̄1, x̄2 different from x∗∗1 , x∗∗2 ,
which implies that peace at {x̄1, x̄2} 6= {x∗∗1 , x∗∗2 } is strictly worse than conflict. The
proposition follows by continuity.
Proof of Proposition 3. Call G the total investment in guns, with β the fraction of
G invested by player 1, so that ḡ1 = βG. Constraint (6) becomes







If the LHS of the above inequality crosses its RHS, it will actually cross twice.
The smallest G that satisfies (10) is the smallest of such intercepts, where the LHS
of (10) crosses its RHS from below. This G is minimized whenever the RHS of (10)
is maximized, which happens at β = 1/2. At this β (10) becomes











If α ≤ 1, the above solution always exists. It is also easy to check that social welfare
in case of peace is strictly greater than social welfare in case of conflict for α < 1
and is equal to social welfare in case of peace for α = 1. Social welfare in case of
peace is also strictly decreasing (for a numerical solution, see Figure 2).
If instead α > 1, then G∗ does not exist. It is not possible to satisfy (10) and
hence conflict is the only outcome.
Proof of Proposition 4. Call G the total investment in guns, with β the fraction of
G invested by player 1, so that ḡ1 = βG. Call E the total expenditure in eggs, with
γ the fraction invested by player 1, so that ē1 = γE. Constraint (7) becomes











(τ + α− 1)E
Fig. 4: LHS and RHS of 10, case 2.
We fix E and look for the smallest G that satisfies the above constraint for some
β and γ.
We distinguish between to cases. Case 1 is:
2(2α− 1) ≤ (τ + α− 1)E,
In this case (10) holds at G = 0, which is therefore the welfare maximizing G for
given E, independently from γ and β. Note that if α ≤ 1/2 the above inequality
holds at E = 0, which implies that the first best is achievable. If instead α > 1/2
(which is what we assume here) then if τ + α ≤ 1 the above inequality never holds
and hence we are never in this case. If τ + α > 1 the above inequality holds for
E ≥ 2(1−2α)
α+τ−1 . Note that because E is chosen optimally, then this case can emerge
because E = 2(1−2α)
α+τ−1 , which is also a subcase of case 2 (below).
Case 2 is:
2(2α− 1) ≥ (τ + α− 1)E.
In this case the LHS of (10) crosses its RHS twice (see Figure 4). The smallest G
that satisfies (10) is the smallest of such intercepts, where the LHS of (10) crosses
its RHS from below. This G is minimized whenever the RHS of (10) is maximized.
For given γ, the RHS is maximized at β = (2 − γE)/(4 − E). By plugging this
value of β into the RHS of 10, we see that the γ drops out. There are therefore
multiple possible combinations of γ and β that maximize the RHS of (10). Among
these solutions, the one at which the feasibility constraint is more likely to hold is
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β = γ = 1/2. At those γ and β (10) becomes



















A(E) ≡ (4− E) [E(τ(1 + α)− 1) + 2(1− α)]
The key observation is that G(E) may not exist. When this is the case, there
is no political process that satisfies the no-deviation constraint. The existence of
G(E) for some feasible E depends on cases:
• If α ≤ 1, thenG(E) exists for some feasible E. To see this, just consider E = 0,







which is feasible because simple algebra shows
that G(0) < 2.
• If α > 1 and τ ≤ 1
1+α
then G(E) never exists. If instead τ > 1
1+α
then G(E)
exists for E sufficiently large. The E such that G(E) exists may, however, not
be feasible. To see this, consider the smallest E such that G(E) exists (that
is, such that A(E) = 0): E = 2 α−1
τ(α+1)−1 . At this E the feasibility constraint
holds if:
E +G(E) = 2
α− 1
τ(α + 1)− 1
(
1 +








τ ≥ τ̄ ≡ α
1− α2 + 2α
To conclude, note that τ̄ > 1
1+α
whenever α > 1. Hence, whenever α > 1,
τ ≥ τ̄ guarantees the existence of G(E) at some E. Also, because τ must be






Proof of Proposition 5. In the proof of Proposition 4 we derived G(E), which, if




(4− E)E(2τ − 1)
2
If τ < 1/2, then the only solution is E = 0, G = 1, which is the same solution
derived in the model without eggs. If instead τ ≥ 1/2 then G(E) exists for all
feasible values of E.
The value of E is chosen to to minimize G(E) + (1− τ)E, which here becomes
1 + (1− τ)E −
√
(4− E)E(2τ − 1)
2
There are three possible solutions: a corner solution at E = 0, a corner solution at
E +G(E) = 2, and an interior solution.
Taking first order conditions we get
E = 2 +
1− τ√
4τ 2 − 6τ + 3
which is, however, not feasible.
At the corner solution E = 0 we are back at the case without eggs, and social
welfare is 1.

















which is greater than 1 only if τ > 4/7.
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